


Textbook of Psychoanalysis

Second Edition

Edited by

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Introduction

Seven years have passed since the publication of the previous edition of this textbook. Since that time, we have learned that students of many different disciplines and from many different levels of training have found the textbook useful. In addition, experienced analysts have also found portions of the book to be helpful in providing overviews of various psychoanalytic topics. Although Sigmund Freud observed that psychoanalysis can be described as a theory, a treatment, and a method of research, it has also clearly become a way of thinking about the human condition that transcends clinical settings and has broad applications to the arts, the social and biological sciences, philosophy, and the humanities.

In this new edition, we have once again attempted to reach a broad audience, one that encompasses a knowledge base from the beginning student to the seasoned analyst or academician. Two new editors have joined the project for this second edition, Bonnie Litowitz and Paul Williams, both of whom reflect the interdisciplinary nature of psychoanalytic thought today. Dr. Litowitz has a background in linguistics that has informed her psychoanalytic writing and practice, and Dr. Williams trained as a social anthropologist prior to his psychoanalytic training. Both now spend a good deal of their time engaged in clinical psychoanalytic work.

Ethel Person and Arnold Cooper, two of the co-editors of the previous edition of the text, have not been involved in the development of this volume, and we dedicate this second edition to them. We are indebted to both Drs. Person and Cooper for their leadership in shaping a vision of what a textbook of psychoanalysis should be. During the preparation of this edition of the textbook, Dr. Cooper passed away. Only a week before he died, we contacted him to let him know that this volume would be dedicated to him and to Dr. Person. He was very pleased to hear the news, and he wished us the

best of luck with it. We will miss him, but he will continue to inspire our work.

We have been ably assisted in our work on this new edition by a superb group of section editors: Robert Michels for Section I, "General Introduction"; Richard Zimmer for Section II, "Core Concepts"; Adrienne Harris for Section III, "Schools of Thought"; Steven H. Cooper for Section IV, "Treatment and Technique"; Linda C. Mayes for Section V, "Research"; and Jeffrey Prager for Section VI, "Psychoanalysis and Other Disciplines." The section editors, who themselves reflect the diversity of backgrounds and thinking in contemporary American psychoanalysis, have put their own personal stamp on the organization of their sections, including the topics and authors, and all have worked closely with their chapter authors to shape the final product. We are indebted to them for their efforts.

Readers familiar with the first edition of this textbook will note that the six categories covered by the section editors reflect a change in format for this new edition. The new format reflects our decision to focus on American psychoanalysis in the second decade of the 21st century in all its conceptual and clinical diversity. To this end, we have introduced a new section called "Schools of Thought," and we have discontinued the section on the history of psychoanalysis that attempted to cover psychoanalytic views throughout the world. The new section titled "Schools of Thought" recognizes that American psychoanalysis today is a pluralistic endeavor. There is no "party line" anymore, and a wide variety of theoretical models are used extensively by American clinicians, often in approaches that draw aspects of different models into a private amalgam that may vary from one analytic couple to another.

It became clear to us that a comprehensive characterization of psychoanalysis throughout the world would be

a daunting task given that psychoanalysis has, during recent years, achieved a significant presence in Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and other parts of Asia. These dramatic developments in the discipline since the publication of the first edition, taking place in widely differing cultural contexts, led us to conclude that we would be hard-pressed to keep up with developments throughout every region of the world in a single textbook. Moreover, attempting to characterize the developments within psychoanalysis in even one country, such as France, or one geographical region, such as South America, in one brief textbook chapter could only offer a superficial overview of their unique histories and contributions. Hence, as noted, we decided to reorganize the text in this volume to provide an in-depth view of this current moment in American psychoanalysis. To be sure, influences from abroad are discussed throughout many chapters in light of the increasing cross-pollination between countries and theoretical models. It would be difficult to write about object relations, for example, without tracing the British influence on the theory, and similarly, one cannot write about the Lacanian point of view without taking into account French views. Chapter authors from overseas have been selected for their specialized knowledge of these contributions.

Because most psychoanalytic theories incorporate developmental components, we have made a further change to this edition by subsuming the developmental theory section from the first edition into the “Schools of Thought” section in our current edition. Developmental themes appear throughout other chapters as well. We have added a section titled “General Introduction” that includes a chapter on Freud and his early circle of

colleagues as well as a contribution on developments in post-Freudian psychoanalysis to orient the reader to historical trends.

The editors wish to express our appreciation to the American Psychiatric Publishing staff for their support in a variety of ways throughout the project. Tina Coltri-Marshall handled all the correspondence and efficiently maintained a central “headquarters” for all authors and editors so that we had up-to-date information on the progress of the text. Greg Kuny was instrumental in managing the transition from a collection of submitted chapters to a finished textbook. We also wish to thank Robert Hales, APPI Editor-in-Chief, for recognizing psychoanalysis as an integral part of psychiatry.

Finally, we want to make note of the fact that psychoanalysts today compete in a marketplace that offers a variety of psychotherapeutic interventions. In this postmodern marketplace, the psychological needs of those it serves often are unmet when economic, ideological, or political priorities take precedence over clinical understanding. Hence we wish to express a special appreciation to our readers—those who practice psychoanalysis, those who are learning psychoanalysis, and those who apply psychoanalytic thinking to related disciplines—for having the courage to continue to embrace a model of the human psyche that has always been controversial, even subversive, and to believe that this model of the mind still provides our best and most comprehensive understanding of human nature.

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Psychoanalysis and Music

Alexander Stein, Ph.D.

MUSIC AND PSYCHOANALYSIS are connected by three common concerns: hermeneutics, or the study of meaning; the nature and expression of affects; and forms of communication. Scholars and practitioners in both disciplines share theoretical and practical interests even as they employ different methodologies and emphases in understanding mechanisms of representation and the nature, expression, and interpretation of human emotion and creativity.

In addition, music and psychoanalysis both prioritize the same auditory channel of communication. Music is primarily an auditory art, and psychoanalysis significantly expands an understanding of audition as a neuro-psycho-physical process that is distinct from all other sensory experiences in the construction of inner experience. In this regard, music can be conceived as symbolically communicating aspects of mental life using sound formations in time. Consequently, the fundamental nexus of music and psychoanalysis is the interpretation of meaning from sound.

In what follows, I first provide a historical overview, highlighting key concepts of past and current writing on

psychoanalytic perspectives on music and ultimately drawing a sharp distinction between “applied” and “interdisciplinary” approaches. In the second section, I explore aspects of auditory experience on which music draws, in which each child is constituted, and through which psychoanalysis understands affect and meaning.

Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Music: History and Conceptual Overview

Writings about the arts from a psychoanalytic perspective have appeared since the inception of psychoanalysis itself. With many of Freud’s early writings and through the weekly discussions held between 1901 and 1906 of the so-called Wednesday Society, forerunner to the

Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, a door opened out of the consulting room and into the artist's studio. Countless psychoanalysts—as well as many nonclinicians schooled in psychoanalytic theory—followed, proposing that psychoanalytic conceptualizations of mental life could uniquely and profitably illuminate the artist and his or her creative productions. Although Freud pointedly eschewed music in favor of archaeology and the visual and literary arts, another of the Wednesday Society's founding members was musicologist Max Graf (the father of the boy in Freud's [1909] Little Hans case). Graf's (1911) essay on Wagner and *The Flying Dutchman* can be designated the first distinctly psychoanalytic inquiry into music and musical creativity.

In the following half century, relatively few psychoanalytic studies of music were produced as compared with works focused on other forms of artistic expression (Noy 1966, 1967; Sterba 1965). Kris's (1952) groundbreaking work *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art* signaled the emergence of more sophisticated applications of Freudian ideas in the arts and creativity. The second half of the 20th century marked a continued shifting away from the historically dominant "regressive" model that tended to correlate pathology and creativity. Writings from the mid-1950s and beyond, however, moved more toward ego-psychologically oriented formulations, emphasizing conflict-free, adaptive, and less neurotically or psychotically influential factors in relation to the psychic organization of the composer as well as the effects of music on the listener.

This change in the climate of psychoanalytic theorizing, coupled with works about music by authors equally knowledgeable about music *and* psychoanalysis, gave rise to a new generation of writings in which equal emphasis could be placed on the music itself rather than only on the mind of the composer or listener. This new combined approach allowed the extrapsychological data of the music—i.e., its unique and specific forms of notation, form, grammar, and syntactical structure—to be understood (or at least addressed) both on its own terms *and* as aural representations of mental functioning.

The relative recent history of this mode of the conjoined study of music and psychoanalysis can be traced to the late Stuart Feder, who until his untimely death in 2005 was its most eminent, prolific, and eloquent spokesman. Other important contributions by authors trained both as psychoanalysts and as musicians include works by Martin Nass, Gilbert Rose, Peter Ostwald, Pincas Noy, Alexander Stein, and Morton Reiser, among others (see <http://www.mindandmusic.org/bibliog.html> for a comprehensive, if not exhaustive, roster).

Beginning with his first article on Gustav Mahler published in 1978 in *The International Review of Psychoanalysis*, Feder produced many groundbreaking works on music and psychoanalysis (Feder 1978, 1981). Notable among these are books on Charles Ives (*Charles Ives: "My Father's Song": A Psychoanalytic Biography*, Feder 1992) and Gustav Mahler (*Gustav Mahler: A Life in Crisis*, Feder 2004). The two-volume *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Music* series (Feder 1993; co-edited with Richard Karmel and George Pollock) helped establish music and psychoanalysis as an interdisciplinary field in its own right. Feder's (1982) probing essay on "nostalgia" remains a touchstone in the psychoanalytic literature, simultaneously redressing an underdeveloped dimension of affect theory and illuminating important facets of Ives scholarship.

Feder established an original perspective in relating the biographical data of composers' lives to their creative life in music. He sought to illuminate the overdetermined and multifunctional relationship between the artist's mental life and the music itself by way of a sophisticated, synthesized understanding of both areas. In this mode of analysis, Feder departed significantly from both earlier psychobiographies of composers and psychoanalytic writings on music. He advanced the premise that, in considering the relationship between music and affect, writings on the aesthetics, history, or philosophy of music have always grappled with the manner in which music reflects, symbolizes, and communicates aspects of inner life.

The study of the relationship between affect and music from this point forward has had far-reaching and reciprocal benefits for psychoanalysts as well as for musicians, musicologists, and others studying or writing about music and musicians. On this view, a musical and psychoanalytically knowledgeable study of the nature of representation in the auditory sphere, that is, of *auditory symbolism*, together with understanding how affect achieves auditory representation, yields a more expansive conceptualization of the nature of affect in mental life (Feder 1982).

Music is therefore considered not only from aesthetic or philosophical perspectives but also as directly related to the mental processes of the composer: "To study the 'complete biography' of an artist such as Mahler," Feder (1978) wrote, "it would not suffice to use only the usual materials of biography such as personal accounts, letters and the like, and to omit documents which reveal mental content expressed and realized in his own most characteristic manner of conceptualizing, namely, the form of thought known as music" (p. 127).

In light of this background, writings about aspects of music and psychoanalysis can be roughly organized into three general categories: 1) those that deal with the biography of the composer and attempts to understand the composition through his or her life events; 2) those that present psychoanalytic treatment studies of musicians and composers; and 3) those that attempt a metapsychological approach to understanding the psychological meaning of music. The psychoanalytic approach taken within each of these categories has tended to reflect the theoretical focus dominant at the time of writing.

Musicologists, aestheticians, and philosophers have long disagreed about how to conceptualize or articulate music, meaning, and emotional experience. Over time, many formulations have been advanced to explain the interrelation of music and emotional experience. For example, Noy (1993) distilled three primary conceptualizations:

1. *The narrative route*—Music is itself the site of some immanent, pre-encoded narrative to be transmitted to a listener.
2. *The direct route*—Music is isomorphically concordant with the listener's emotions. This was an application of a theory of isomorphism espoused by Susanne Langer (1953), a philosopher whose writings on meaning, logic, art, and symbolism have been influential to musicologists and to psychoanalysts involved in the philosophy of music. She took the view that "the tonal structures we call 'music' bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feelings...music is a tonal analogy of emotive life" (Langer 1953, p. 27). In related but independently conducted research, Pratt (1952) conceived of auditory patterns that find correspondence with organic and visceral patterns in the body, concluding, thus, that music sounds the way emotion feels. This defining view of the so-called isomorphist school suggests that a listener's emotions are activated directly by the innate content of the message, a concept akin to the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis: the experience of learning as bringing to consciousness what the soul already knows from an earlier existence.
3. *The indirect route*—The listener's emotional reactions are the result of defensive ego-reorganizational activity triggered by auditory stimuli; if the music in its progression surprisingly deviates from its expected sequence to present something unexpected, the apparatus of perception will be called into action to edit the musical input to fit the form. Kohut and Levarie (1950), for example, suggested that when

listeners are "trapped" in the concert hall and "confronted" with entirely unfamiliar atonal music, they will be "unable to cope" (p. 76) with the unfamiliar sounds and will experience a gradual rise of anxious tension at the strange sounds that they cannot master. Heinz Kohut's proposition departed from the prevailing views of his time by restoring agency to the listener and wresting activity from its prior position as the exclusive property of the artistic message. According to Kohut, the listener could no longer be considered simply a passive recipient of a musical communication, the meaning of which was pre-embedded, but rather as an active agent in organizing and attributing, albeit unconsciously, his or her own meaning to such communication. In psychoanalytic terms, the music's effect on a listening subject derives from the resistance mounted against the spontaneous recuperation of the repressed memory of an archaic relationship with music qua symbolic representation.

The prevailing psychoanalytic view is less preoccupied with provenance. Rather, it attends to the dynamic interplay between what can be roughly distinguished as internal elements (psychological, psychoacoustic, psychosomatic, affective, proprioceptive) and external ones (musical, cultural, environmental, sociohistorical, political-aesthetic). Gilbert Rose (1992) underscored this conceptualization by noting "human emotion cannot exist embedded in the inorganic structure of aesthetic form. The structure can only offer the necessary perceptual conditions for an emotional response to occur" (p. 216).

The interaction between music and a listener (or composer) is thus neither an aesthetic creation in which the wealth of human emotion inheres in toto nor a concordant sounding board that resonates sympathetically with a listener's internal affective life, but rather an object relation. As such, an encounter with music triggers complex intrapsychic events or responses. The aesthetic/emotional gestalt experience of music's effects within us can generally be understood as comprising perceptions, distortions, and condensations of time and memory as well as archaically derivative fantasies, defenses, and modes of internalizing, expressing, and responding to affects, all operating within an abstract primary process mode of registering, construing, constructing, and reconstructing experience (Stein 2004b).

Feder (2004) encapsulates these wide-ranging formulations in his felicitously phrased idea of *music as simulacrum*—music as an analogue of the totality of mental life:

Among the elements the listener brings to the musical experience is a latent awareness of mental process that is properly called preconscious. It is the conveyor, as it were, of images, ideas, affects, memory, fantasy etc; all of which may participate in the individual musical experience. However, the doings of mind itself are readily perceived with a change of focus: that is, the introspective perception of mental process as opposed to mental content. It is precisely to this that the simulacra of mental life in music addresses itself. . . . [A] fundamental feature of mentation is encoded in music; indeed, as such, it is a basic aspect of nature and of human nature. This allows for an entrainment on the part of the listener to diverse and at first unfamiliar musical ideas, and may thus provide an added dimension of meaning and appreciation. (p. 20)

One of the chief difficulties in articulating musical experience is the need to bridge the divide between the linguistic realm and a nonverbal, nonlinguistic, and nonobjective one. Clinical psychoanalysis is, after all, the so-called *talking cure*, and music does not, strictly speaking, *talk*. When we use words to describe musical processes and sounds, in other words, we are shifting from a basically nondiscursive form to a discursive one (Nass 1989). Scholars of music wrestle with this in identifying the mechanisms of expressive reference and also in determining the locus of expressive meaning in music, what Nelson Goodman (1968) considered “the place to look in music” for properties metaphorically exemplified. In a now-famous letter written on October 15, 1842, to Marc-André Souchay in Berlin, the composer Felix Mendelssohn expressed this same tension, though privileging the transparent meaning of music when compared with words themselves:

There is so much talk about music, and yet so little is said. For my part, I believe that words do not suffice for such a purpose. . . . People often complain that music is too ambiguous; that what they should think when they hear it is so unclear, whereas everyone understands words. With me it is exactly the reverse, and not only with regard to an entire speech, but also with individual words. These, too, seem to me so ambiguous, so vague, so easily misunderstood in comparison to genuine music. . . . The thoughts which are expressed to me by music that I love are not too indefinite to be put into words, but on the contrary, too definite. . . . The same words never mean the same things to different people. Only the song can say the same thing, can arouse the same feelings in one person as in another, a feeling which is not expressed, however, by the same words. . . . Words have many meanings, but music we could both understand correctly. (cited in Newcomb 1984, p. 635 and footnote 58, p. 642)

Words to Music: How Does Psychoanalysis Contribute to Musical Understanding?

There is a plethora of issues involved in bringing psychoanalysis to bear on musical forms. Chief among these is rendering assessments of intention, evidence, and methodology in constructing psychoanalytically informed formulations without a patient and outside the consulting room. On this topic, the literature is ample (see, e.g., Baudry 1984; Esman 1998; Kaplan 1988). Such works are generally understood as examples of “applied psychoanalysis.” Yet thinking of psychoanalytic contributions that may be possible beyond the analyst-analysand dyad as “applied” encourages an analysis of, say, musical forms as simply applying psychoanalytic concepts to better understand the composer’s motivation or interest in writing music. It is one-directional in its method and limiting in the kinds of evidence considered toward understanding music and its effect on the listener. More recent efforts to understand artists and artistic forms psychoanalytically appreciate, instead, the interdisciplinarity of the method: aspiring to use an in-depth understanding of music to illuminate the problem of interpreting meaning and motivation and an in-depth psychology to comprehend and evaluate specific musical forms.

Baudry (1984), for example, considered the gains derived from evaluating a work of art (or the artist who created it) within a psychoanalytic framework of interpretation and meaning. Of the various art forms he discussed, music was not directly addressed. Just the same, one of his methodological categories applies: the reaction of the reader (or here, a listener) to the production of poetic and aesthetic effect. This approach focuses both on the listener who hears the music and on the thematic analysis of the musical score that identifies traces or derivatives of mental contents of the composer. The intention is to interpret the meaning that underlies the text—“a” really means “b,” holding on the same plane both the listener and the production of the musical composition. Thus a range of interpretive possibilities is open, depending on whether one conceptualizes the music as, say, representative of an acoustical mirror or as a container for a listener’s projections.

Analogy, simile, and metaphor in so-called applied psychoanalytic investigations appear unavoidable when comparing what are typically regarded as essentially different modes of expression. In his theorizing about the creative process, Freud (1908) saw dreams and dream states as the artist’s primary muse and here established

the paradigmatic relevant analogy: the poet is like a child at play. In addition, such analogical conventions are subject to the vagaries of interpreting the terminology itself. Arnold Schoenberg (1923), for example, bemoaned the expression “atonal music,” considering it equivalently meaningless to calling flying “the art of not falling” or swimming “the art of not drowning” (p. 210). According to Schoenberg, all relationships between and among tones are by definition *tonal*, provided that they form a progression that is logical and comprehensible; by extension, an opposite, *atonal*, can no more exist among tones and tone relationships than can an opposite “aspectral” or “acomplementary” exist among colors and progressions of colors (p. 211). In Schoenberg’s view, then, “atonality” describes a quality of the listener, not a feature of the music itself. Thus, applied psychoanalysis, implying in this case the characterization of the music itself, obscures interest in the listener and the relationship between the hearer and the heard.

Nass (1989) observed in his critical review of the literature on psychoanalysis and the arts that “one of the most common methodological errors made in applied psychoanalysis is the evaluation of an aesthetic work on the basis of its dynamic meaning in the history of the artist, rather than through criteria that concern themselves with the aesthetic value of the work itself” (p. 159). Wary of the trend toward pathologizing art and artists, Nass cautioned that psychoanalysis “should avoid reductionistic moves toward explanations of creative activity strictly on the basis of conflict and understandings of works of art strictly on the basis of a narrow view of the artist’s motivation” (Nass 1989, p. 160). The creative act, in Nass’s view, “serves a variety of intrapsychic functions as well as interactive ones, and though it may become involved with conflict it does not strictly arise from conflicted behavior” (p. 160).

As noted here, the preponderance of “applied” psychoanalytic enterprises has historically been produced by psychoanalysts who, although specialists in understanding the doings of the mind and perhaps passionate about an art form, frequently have no specialized knowledge of music or art or literature. More often than not, applied analysis actually implies an imperious incursion into a foreign discipline, the results of which hold dubious scholarly merit.

To achieve the aims implicitly established, for instance, by Feder’s writings, interdisciplinary literacy has become increasingly important. Whether psychoanalysis is used to deepen our understanding of other disciplines, such as music, or to sharpen our perception and description of what is going on within the patient or be-

tween the analyst and analysand, it is not sufficient simply to rely on metaphor and simile drawn from elsewhere or to reduce musical expression simply to psychoanalytic categories. Current discussions in psychoanalytic journals on even such foundational topics as interpretation, evidence, transference, countertransference, and diagnosis underscore that the scope of psychoanalysis is still widening. Utilizing works of literature, film, art, and music has a long, established history; at this point it certainly requires no further substantiation or justification as a credible primary source for material in the study of the human mind or in the explication of psychoanalytic principles, so long as both disciplines are handled expertly. The goal is to generate an *interdisciplinary psychoanalysis*, not an “applied” one.

Music as Words: Pitfalls in Applying Musical Language to Describe the Psychoanalytic Process

There are certain intrinsic difficulties in “importing” musical terminology to describe the psychoanalytic situation. Tone, rhythm, harmony, and melody, among others, can often be employed to better describe the nuances of feeling and experience between analyst and analysand. However, the use of these terms or others derived from music—a grammar and vocabulary unique unto themselves—to characterize psychoanalytic phenomena is fraught with misunderstanding and misinterpretation. By employing terminology from music in the ostensible service of more clearly explaining a psychoanalytic principle or clinical encounter, one has typically only differently described it.

Music is closely tied with primary process experience—that is, music can be felt without secondary elaboration or executive cognition about its meaning (Stein 1999). Conceptualizing analytic moments in musical terms, whether intrapsychically or interpersonally, can therefore be an important point of entry for gleaning insight into a patient’s unconscious process, fantasy, and imaginings underlying or constituting his or her affective expressions. Yet the pitfalls must be overcome of an overly reductive categorization of abstract nonverbal expressions such as timbre, pace, intensity, or semiotic recognizability; in this case, “music” will otherwise have merit only as a descriptive analogue. Little is ultimately communicated unless the analyst’s underlying assumptions about the dynamic interplay of perception and response, interpretation and meaning, and thought

and feeling as between analyst and analysand are contextualized and correlated with the idea of music and the analyst's theoretical frame of reference. If musical metaphor is being used to better understand a patient's expressions—in other words, if meaning is being ascribed to the “music” of the affective discursive exchange between analyst and analysand—how is that meaning being derived? Of what is it constituted? In what ways are the semiotically ambiguous abstractions called “music” interpretively germane to the clinical material? Absent any cross-orientational consensus on precisely how the emotional reactions of the analyst are supposed to serve as a reliable indicator of what the patient is feeling, descriptions of analytic interpretations, most particularly those derived from nonverbal expressions, are of limited value unless the clinician's theoretical and technical foundations can be clearly articulated.

A related danger is a too-simple application of musical metaphor and simile to describe analytic technique and process. Phillips (1988), a psychiatrist who draws on personal experience as a jazz performer in writing about his clinical work, has succinctly described the prevalence of “extratherapeutic models” in clinicians' conceiving of the creativity of their work with patients; in addition to music, which is exceedingly popular among analysts and psychiatrists, he listed “Asian martial arts, dancing, painting, sculpturing, gardening, playing tennis or basketball, understanding fine literature, acting and learning a spiritual discipline” (p. 189) as some of the other oft-used metaphors.

It is important to distinguish between musical associations—meaning when a piece of music or musical refrain rather than a thought, sentence, or image is reported by a patient (and/or internally noted by the analyst, or both) as an association (Goodin 1999; Payne 1974)—and an artificially imposed emphasis on the “musicality” of the dialogue (verbal or otherwise) in the analytic situation.

Music for Psychoanalysis, Music in Its Own Terms, Psychoanalysis for Music

What Is Music?

Music can be simply defined as “the combination of sounds and silences into rhythms, melodies, harmonies, and contrapuntal patterns... operating essentially

in the acoustic-auditory realm of human experience, and closely related to language” (Ostwald and Morrison 1988, p. 55). Every style and type of music in the world has its own conventions, traditions, performance practices, and musical grammar and sound that define it. In each instance, nonetheless, music is a sophisticated language of semantic, harmonic, intervallic, rhythmic, and scalar relationships.

Although commonly referred to as a “nonverbal” art, music is a language more properly considered in the context of the psychic mechanisms and processes of verbalization and can thus aptly be termed “nonlinguistic.” Although semantically abstract, music is a language of greater harmonic flexibility and range than the language of words, which, from a unitary perspective, is inherently sequential and monophonic. Alone, we cannot speak or sing chordally or contrapuntally. Yet the mind's ear can conjure polyphony or the sound of a full orchestra, letting us internally “hear” complex sonic or musical structures. An auditory analogue of dreams, intrapsychic audition, and intravocalization render elements of primary process mentation via conjured sound. The challenge for psychoanalysis is to understand the relationship of the sound formations classified as music to their meaning and emotional value to the individual.

What Is a Musician?

Psychoanalysis offers unique tools and conceptual perspectives for understanding the psychological formation and development of individuals who become musicians. What prompts a person to dedicate himself or herself to one creative enterprise but not another? What are the psychological distinctions between or among them? What constitutes the choices to, say, paint rather than sculpt or to paint abstractly rather than representationally? To write prose, poetry, or dramatic dialogue? To compose rather than perform? To conduct or to play the bassoon or clarinet or trumpet but not the piano or cello or violin?

Beyond a finite set of overarching ingredients specific to each artistic or scientific enterprise, each medium has its own unique and particular subsets of specialization, each requiring differing forms of training, education, or preparation; engaging different personal (as well as social) characteristics, temperaments, and sensibilities; or calling up widely divergent affinities and proclivities (for instance, the smell of turpentine and oil paints; the texture of wood; the tactile qualities and resilience of stone; the sound of a typewriter or computer keyboard or the scratch of the pen or pencil

on the paper; the meanings and communicative possibilities of words; the evocative experience of cradling the violin under the chin or holding the bow in the hand, the feel of the reed in the mouth; the sensual embrace of the cello and the sonorities it produces; or more generally, the rich panoply of feelings and associations aroused by hearing and playing the repertoire composed for any particular instrument).

There is a host of constitutive elements distinct to musicians as a class of professional artists. Musicians (especially classical musicians) typically commence their rigorous preparatory training in childhood. There is consequently a “tremendous, life-long ego investment in and entwinement of identity vis-à-vis the chosen instrument and the many issues affiliated with mastery and performance on it” (Nagel 1988, p. 145). Among the skills and attributes that begin to develop from an early age are “exceptional levels of discipline; a heightened toleration for isolation and waiting deriving from the intensive rigors of daily practice and concertizing; augmented powers of concentration and recall memory; an effective sublimatory capacity to split off from real or imagined feelings of anxiety or threat and to remain at least supercially poised during moments of duress” (Stein 2004b, pp. 761–762).

The musician’s relationship to her or his instrument, then, is a complex psychological, physical, and emotional amalgam. Acquiring technical and interpretive expertise requires sustained and focused effort. This work, called “practice” during rehearsal and “play” during performance, can be conceptualized as a processive forum for mastery—of the musical score, motor coordination, affect regulation (or manipulation), and multiple conscious and unconscious mental tasks (Nagel 1988). There is a profound, intimately tactile, and eroticized physical relationship to the instrument. The sounds of the instrument, not just the sound of the music, become directly connected for the musician with individual thought, feeling, self-perception, and bodily action. Crucial aspects of subjectivity—the idea of a musical personality as an intrapsychic and intersubjective co-construction, a distinctive personal sonic style, interpretive originality, measurement of self-value, and constituent of self-hood—are thus created and extended outward in the sounds and through the infinitely repeated bodily movements required to successfully produce and consistently reproduce them (Cumming 2000).

These intricately entwined aspects of physicality in the construction and production of sound and musical identity become laced together with other less tangible threads. A complex metaphysical relationship is estab-

lished with the musical score—a system of written notation having its own structure, grammar, and syntax and entailing its own processes of integration and internalization. This psychophysical incorporation equally encompasses the idiosyncratic (and often vaguely defined) constituents of artistry and interpretation, knowledge of style, music theory and history, and performance practices. It also includes a richly populated internalized object world comprised of teachers, mentors, parents, siblings, idols, rivals, colleagues, composers, and a roster of other real, imagined, prospective, or historical auditors of every quality, any or all of whom can be (or are) critical and condemning, neutral or unresponsive, or laudatory and adulating (Stein 2004b).

Especially because the formative processes of training to become a concert artist typically begin at an early age, there are also numerous developmental and psychosexual factors that underlie the motivation to become a musician and necessarily become integrated (or arrested) aspects of character structure (Stein 2004b). The impulse to perform, although not exclusive to musicians, can be understood, similarly, as an extended transformation of the child’s early experiences vis-à-vis important adults’ responses to narcissistic and exhibitionistic strivings. Performing can be narcissistically and exhibitionistically gratifying or, conversely, psychologically overwhelming or anxiety producing, or some imbalanced combination of these, and can betoken the giving and receiving (or the withholding and frustration) of both pleasure and discomfort. Involving as it does such fantastic quotients of ego and other investments of self, making and performing music is, as Cumming (2000) suggested, “interiority made into sound” (p. 8). In this, the musical performer is highly vulnerable; the wish (or impulse) to perform may be psychologically separate from the desire to make music.

Performing, as distinct from music making, can be generated by a host of complex, even contradictory, archaic needs, including to be watched (as well as heard) and appreciated—to be recognized as special, masterful, communicative, gifted, emotive, sensitive, or the like. There may equally exist an aggressive or hostile component, perhaps as a consequence of the absence of those positive forms of recognition or as a displacement from another sphere of mental existence, that may be given acceptable discharge in overpowering the instrument, the music, or the audience (any or all of which can serve as a symbolic condensation of the actual psychological object of hostility) through the manipulation of tempo, dynamic force, virtuosity, and omnipotent fantasies of control and/or merger (Nagel 1988).

The Music of Sounds: Ears, Hearing, Listening

Sounds surround and define us. In innumerable crucial ways, our earliest auditory experiences determine both literally and figuratively what we sound like and who we are. Yet within each of our archives of personal history, the sounds themselves are ephemeral. Made of compressions and vibrations of air, they are less easily preserved than their visual counterparts. Photographs, paintings, writings, or other mementos having durable physical mass seem better suited than sound to cataloguing the past. Such objects are disposed to greater longevity, even permanence, and can be referenced externally by us or others. By contrast, the vast panoply of sounds past—voices, inflections, cadences, silences, yelps, howls, growls, grunts, sighs, slurps, cries, laughs, thumps, creaks—each an acoustical marker of a time, place, person, or experience, are irretrievably lost nearly instantly, reproducible only in a certain sense of the word and only in the mind's ear.

Efforts to resolve the paradox that sound is an integral part of the physical world that nonetheless lacks concreteness or mass are captured in expressions using the word *sound* as a modifier conferring solidity, durability, dependability, or security—for example, “sound thinking,” “sound investment,” “of sound mind.” Such linguistic sleights, so ironically captured in English in these contradictory double meanings, reflect our wish to forestall or reverse the inexorably forward-moving processes of life and death. By its nature, sound, decaying in time, mirrors the life cycle itself, evocatively duplicating the reality of our fragility and impermanence (Stein 2004b).

The kaleidoscope of archaic auditory impressions, perceptions, and audiophonic interactions, together with the miasma of sounds and noises of the body, of the early surround, and of primary relationships, remains audible across the chasms of time and space in the inner ear of imagination and memory, where the internalized voices and sounds of earliest life are permanently ensonced. These sounds and their secondary elaborations are symbolically perceptible, sometimes with striking clarity or merely as abstract, affect-rich impressions. These phantom echoes give voice to the introjects, internalizations, and other condensed and distorted vestiges of our first environment and form the basis for developing self-representation, self-other presentation, and character formation. They resound in dreams, fantasies, and inner speech (endophasy, the audition of thought) as well as in externalized verbal and

linguistic expressions—and, of course, music—symbolically communicating aspects of mental life using sound formations in time.

Auditory impressions are unique: disembodied, vague, or abstract, they may emanate from some unseen or unseeable source; one can hear and be heard in the dark, through walls, or from a distance. This tends both to facilitate a psychological reaching outward—in the dual service of being curious about the surrounding world and of forming connections—and to catalyze an imaginative or fantastical construction that internally endeavors to give sounds (or their source) form, shape, and comprehensibility. This process of the transformation of sound into meaning is basic to human existence and has far-reaching psychological consequences. Perhaps paramount is the development of the imaginative mind—the capacity to symbolize and to extract and exchange signs from sounds bearing communicative and affective significance (Stein 2007).

Critically involved with audition are the ears, physical protuberances that, being both orifice and appendage, are their own rich source of multiple psychic meanings as well as the functionally more significant internal auditory apparatuses. One special function of audition is as a physical process in the construction of inner experience. A psychophysical distinction is thus drawn between hearing—“the reception of stimuli over auditory pathways”—and listening—a more developmentally advanced and usually conscious attempt to “apprehend acoustically” (Knapp 1953, p. 679).

Of signal importance is that the ear and allied physical pathways of audition are never closed. The eyes can be shut or averted at will to block or obscure visual stimuli; the nasal passages can be pinched, and olfactory intake suspended or filtered by controlled inhalation. By contrast, the physical processes of hearing are outside conscious control. Although the outer ear can be covered or the opening to the ear canal plugged, these efforts will but dampen midrange auditory input. Of greater significance, this aspect of anatomic construction results in all manner of environmental and psychological adaptations, coupled with a host of idiosyncratically arrayed fantasies and responses concerning the nature of engulfment, invasion, intrusion, passivity, and receptivity. Prominent are “slips of the ear”—the internal substitution of words, thoughts, or sounds heard for others in the service of some unconscious purpose—and “auditory repression,” which is particularly useful for sleep. “In sleep we are genuinely blind, but only hysterically deaf” (Knapp 1953, p. 686). The autonomous brain is selective in processing or filtering auditory stimuli as a requirement of maintaining sleep; the sleeping mind

remains constantly receptive to external sounds even as visual input is blocked. During sleep, this sensory selectivity nightly recreates our most primitive infantile experience of the world.

Even before birth, sounds from the outside world and the mother's body penetrate into the uterus, reverberating through the amniotic fluid and pulsing around the fetus's body as an audiophonic skin. The intrauterine environment resonates with all manner of bodily noises from the mother, indicators of vital information about her psychological and physical states. By the time a fledgling auditory apparatus has sufficiently developed—at approximately five gestational months—muffled and distorted sounds are tympanized directly into the fetal ears. The fetus becomes a captive auditor to the infinitely varied sounds of mother's world, replete with the incomprehensible music, speech, and noises of adult interaction (Stein 2007).

Expanding upon his notion of the skin ego (Anzieu 1974)—the ego as a containing envelope deriving from internalized infantile proprioceptive and epidermal sensations—Didier Anzieu (1976) advanced the concept of the sound image of the self. This hypothesizes that the inchoate self emerges from a sound bath composed of acoustical stimuli both from within the baby and from its external environment. The sound space is conceived as the first psychic space, an extension into the auditory sphere of the dual functions Winnicott (1941) assigned to the good-enough maternal environment: the appropriate management of the child's body and the mother's face as primitive mirror in which, through and by her expression, the child comes to see him- or herself.

Once the child is born, the fluid, intrauterine audiophonic skin is symbolically crystallized as the sound-filled environment of that outer world. The audiophonic interaction between infants and parents is fantastically complex and may surpass the visual in developmental significance. From the first days and weeks of life outside the mother's womb, the newborn exists in a twilight state dominated by a world of sounds. As the newborn begins to distinguish the sound of its mother's and father's voices from other voices and noises, it also begins the process of incorporating and decoding the expressive value of its parents' acoustic interventions with it as well as conversations between themselves and others. There may be no greater influence on the child than the sound, rhythm, and affective tenor of the parents' discourse and mode of relating with each other and other primary family members (Stein 2007).

The infant's early sound world is the progenitor to all secondary process forms of vocalized expression or phono-symbolic articulations of affect. Almost immedi-

ately following birth, the infant begins babbling, clucking, croaking, smacking, prattling, cooing, sighing, gurgling, and melismatically singing. These protovocalizations form the first attempts at imitating the array of heard sounds as the infant endeavors progressively to differentiate and reproduce the vast repertoire of phonemes and sound gestures that will ultimately constitute its mother tongue. Chief among these utterances is the cry, the prototypical vocal announcement of infancy. The cry itself signifies separateness; it is utterable by the child and audible to the mother only postnatally. Mother, in hearing her infant's cry, and child, in hearing the mother's voice, share a powerful mutual urge to reunite in symbiosis, using the voice as a "bridge across primal separateness" (Spitz 1987, p. 534).

Acknowledged as constituents of that vocal bridge are the musical and prosodic qualities of language—rhythm, intonation, pitch, and timbre. Parents everywhere frequently exaggerate the tonal elements of speech, speaking to their infants in a singsong cadence or higher-pitched voice than used in adult conversation. This is fundamentally a mechanism of fostering language acquisition but will also augment the affective content signified by words whose semantic meaning is as yet incomprehensible to the infant listener. Something analogous is identifiable in the speech of novice students of foreign languages for whom acquisitive language skills typically outpace the expressive, leading to a compensatory exaggeration of tonal inflection as conveyor of meaning and affect. The earliest communication system is made of sounds and is primarily an affective one (Sabbadini 2002).

Sounds as Contact Experiences

The experience of being listened to is central to all human relationships. We express and communicate by audiophonic gesturing with another's reception and response in mind; our first interactions are semiotic exchanges through tone, rhythm, timbre, and volume. The early sound environment potently contributes to the formation and establishment of the self. Pitch and quality of voice are inextricable identifiers of gender (Bunker 1934). The register and sound of parents' voices are foundational elements in gender identity formation as well as critical factors in attendant fantasy elaborations of sexuality, body image, character, aesthetic and social sensibilities, mode of self-expression, and internalized attitudes about relationships. Notwithstanding the pronounced significance of visual or tactile recognition to

psychic development and attachment, auditory sensations and stimuli constitute our primary contact experiences (Niederland 1958).

In each person is an archive of phantom echoes, unthought memories of sounds that have colloquial and idiomatic meanings, carry affective over- and undertones, preserve relational moorings and associations, or are reminders or evocations of pastness. We live and relate with ourselves and others today in ways profoundly shaped and reshaped by all that was, especially how it all sounded, and by the experiences and memories that may always defy being spoken of in words but are encoded in sound.

All of this can be understood by reference to Freud's concept of screen memories, although with an emphasis on the auditory realm—that is, condensations of sonic experiences essentially out of readily retrievable memory and associatively tethered to an otherwise seemingly “forgotten” time of life. Even as memories and affiliated feelings may resurface and cohere, words that might be used to contextualize and verbalize them to one's self or another may be unreachable or even not exist. Why? Because the originating experiences are unrepresented in language; they are only aural memories, residues of sounds and feelings.

Case Study

The foregoing conceptualizations of music, sound, and human experience are profitably engaged in the dyadic clinical encounter in which straightforward language is frequently subordinated to oblique linguistic indicators, silence, wordless metaphors, somaticizations, symptoms, kinetic and sonoric gestures or enactments, or primitive utterances. These present a sound world that is, in its own terms, music. The patient is verbalizing in a language of sounds, some of which may be actual words with recognizable meanings, but regardless, it is communication that can be heard as a form of music—an individual's unique sonic rendering of interiority being verbalized in a language of sounds (Stein 2007).

Consider as illustration Mr. O, a bilingual man in his late 30s with a mild stutter. At the time he entered treatment his attention was dominantly taken up by distress and misgivings about his relationship with a shrewish, volatile, haranguing girlfriend. Although Mr. O's stammer was most pronounced when speaking

with his parents, it was noticeably reduced when speaking English, his second language, and one in which his parents were barely competent.¹ In Mr. O's treatment, special attention was given to the thoughts, feelings, memories, and fantasies unconsciously operative during (or giving rise to) stuttering episodes.

Mr. O's mother emerged in his presentation of her as hysterical, pathologically narcissistic, and intermittently psychotic. With her son, she was both voraciously engulfing and attacking; neglectful in one moment, brutally aggressive in the next. She was psychologically destructive in her disavowal of his separateness. Their fusion returned his desire to retaliate as an attack on himself. Mr. O's father cohered as schizoid and sadistic, although warmer and more constant than the mother. He was an idealized but limited father figure, having stayed married to the Mother/Gorgon and only rarely having come to his son's rescue. In this relational constellation, love, attachment, and self-representation present insoluble conundrums. It is a toxic, no-win environment.

Mr. O talked about the appeal of solitude. Aloneness was freedom and ease. Then, “a large part of what comes out of me is my father,” he said. “A specific rhythm and way I whistle is exactly like my dad.” He recalled a memory from age 5 or 6 years: he was alone in his bed, hearing his father whistling in the house. A flood of memories emerge involving hearing his father humming or whistling. These are quasi-musical enunciations that assured Mr. O of his father's nearby presence and contentedness. Mr. O linked these moments to feelings of safety.

In the vast lexicon of human sounds, humming and whistling are nonverbal expressions falling between nonspecific communications and formal musical structures. Any sound (or gesture) without a fixed or consensual definition can have multiple and contradictory symbolic meanings (Ostwald 1973). The phoneme “m” is an easy sound to produce and occurs in virtually all European languages. When occurring as the word “Hm,” it can signify assent, questioning, negation, disapproval, or, as frequently used in psychotherapeutic settings, a soft sonic hand denoting presence, connection, or understanding. Subtle variations involving timing, intonation, and inflection can signify almost any context-specific meaning. Humming can focus one's concentration or aggressively distract others. It can serve as an audible hesitation while thinking or act as a masking or screening sound, like white noise machines in therapists' waiting rooms.

Greenson (1954) linked the sound “Mm” to the act of humming and its likely early orally gratifying properties.

¹Stuttering is frequently symptomatic of psychosexual developmental conflicts and, as Charlotte Balkányi (1961) suggested, is “the dysfunction of molding affects into words” (p. 108).

The “Mm” sound is predominant in the words used for “mother” in many languages throughout the world; the word *mama*, consisting of a quick repetition of this sound, duplicates the pleasurable labial sensations associated with the act of nursing. When prolonged, the sound “Mmmmm” is used by children cross-culturally to express delight over something that tastes good. The “Mm” sound, then, Greenson concluded, indicates a sense of contentment.

When used by composers in vocal music, humming typically evokes a sense of the ethereal or mysterious. As an echolalic device in music, humming can be explicitly suggestive of the wind, sounds connected with sex, or other expressions of satisfaction.

Whistling, a high-pitched and often shrill sound, is a less complex form of communication than formal language and speech but is still a developmental advance from sounds requiring no skill, intentionality, or muscular control and coordination for production. Purposeful whistling is rarely producible with competence before the age of 5 or 6 years. To whistle, the lips and mouth must be pursed. By tensing this group of facial muscles, a range of sensations is invoked similar to such other orally gratifying processes as biting, chewing, kissing, talking, and sucking. The oval shape of the lips in whistling also mirrors the anal ring, a body opening that can produce a similar sound, is intimately linked with digestion, and partakes in a process with its own gratifying sensations involving containment and release. Whistling thus links the physical substrate and attendant psychic fantasies of inspiration-respiration and ingestion-defecation.

In this, sounds made by the whistling of the body are deeply allied in the mind with the cyclical processes of life and death. It is a sonic act involving control of one’s own body as well as the surround. The whistle can be a signal of location, attention, or distress on par with the cry. As with humming or other wordless sounds, the indeterminacy of meanings in whistling fosters the evocation of inchoate ideas and fantasies stemming from a pregenital, undifferentiated developmental period prior to the consolidation of a sense of interior and exterior self (Stein 2007).

Whistling can have the function of objective self-location; it is psychological sonar or acoustic self-touch, an auditory means of confirming one’s own existence, intactness, aliveness, and place. It is an acoustical mirror through which reassuring confirmation of one’s self comes in hearing the sound of one’s own body. For this reason, “whistling in the dark” can be understood as an attempt at self-soothing, and we “whistle while we wait” to pacify anxieties attendant on it. The physical act, cor-

related sensations, and resulting sounds serve to enliven, and thereby mentally to mitigate, the implosive trends accompanying such anxiety states while also soothing and quieting through the hyperventilation involved in producing the whistle itself. Intrapsychically, the act of whistling serves a double purpose: simultaneously expending and conserving energy.

Humming and whistling are special instances of respiratory extrojection, part of the “respiratory triad” of inhalation, exhalation, and visualization (Grotjahn 1972). It relates to a process of deep inhalation, followed by exhalation of some by-product making the breath visible (such as cigarette smoke) or audible (e.g., laughter, coughing, or throat clearing). It is a symbolic enactment designed to enable one to see or hear one’s own breath, permitting a sense of reassurance that one exists. Filling and emptying the lungs comes in the service of identifying inner boundaries and promoting self-delineation. Listening and sound making are thus linked components in an analogous process involving auditory introjection and exhalatory/sonic extrojection. Singing is a special instance of this.

Just as the stutter is a sonic expression of unconscious conflict and overwhelming affect states, nonlinguistic sounds and verbalizations likewise carry polyvalent symbolic significance. These quasimusical utterances figured meaningfully for Mr. O and were a gateway to his inner world. They could be understood as an auditory/respiratory process of self-delineation, an important psychic operation in its relation to the invasive and annihilating archaic maternal relationship. They produced a sonic umbilicus to the father, whose maternal capacity, however circumscribed, had been crucial to fostering some modicum of attachment. They represented both a somatic and sonic identification with the contented, idealized, and self-contained father, sponsoring in sound and physical sensation the fantasies, affects, and general parental ambiance affiliated in Mr. O’s mind with his father’s sound making. Music’s capacity to induce perceptual distortions of time laid behind Mr. O’s attempt to control (or manipulate) time as a consequence of the gross disharmony, misattunement, and arrhythmia between his parents and him (Yates 1935). It could also be heard as a shift into another language that confers a new dimension of meaning and functions as the signifier of a bridge between aspects of repressed mentation and conscious expression. Both humming and whistling are produced through the steady exhalation of air. Both sounds can be modulated by interrupting or adjusting the rate of air flow, but a fixed, open, and continuous stream of air is requisite. They are vastly different in production and aural experi-

ence from the choked, stifled, halting, constricted, and disjointed stutter—the sounds of how it felt to be Mr. O

Music and Time

Time is one of music's most significant constitutive elements. As a general proposition, music, unlike the visual, is abstract, intangible, and ethereal, disappearing no sooner than it is created. Technology can defeat the natural decay of sound—consider the development of recording devices that can capture and preserve it—and this can provide a calming semblance of permanence. Yet this does not really reverse its evaporation or resolve the paradox that sound is an integral, essential part of the physical world that nonetheless lacks concreteness or mass. In this, music mirrors many fantasies about life and death, repealing the wishes of psychic reality for immortality or resurrection even while introducing an unavoidable reminder, at once painful and pleasurable, of life's fragility and impermanence.

French Impressionist composer Claude Debussy defined music as “rhythmicized time.” The preponderance of music in the Western classical canon—tonal music of the European tradition until approximately the introduction of serialism at the turn of the twentieth century—is “discursive,” using Suzanne Langer's (1957) word, meaning that its formal structure unfolds successively in real time, like a narrative. This forward-moving narrative can spontaneously evoke regressive associative responses that in the mind of the listener can seem to skew, compress, expand, reverse, stop, or defy time. This plasticity of time, trenchantly defined by Rose (1992), “is the experience of the movement of lived time made audible” (p. 156).

A psychoanalytic understanding of time includes such ideas as the timelessness of the unconscious, the alinearity and asynchrony of primary process functioning, and the private, personal, and subjective experiential meaning of “psychological time.” Additionally illustrative, for example, are elements of dream work such as condensation, distortion, displacement, and reversal. Also profitably considered at the intersection of aesthetic and psychoanalytic conceptualizations of time's significance in subjective experience are the Greek concepts *kairos*—denoting the experience of ebb and flow of episodic time along a continuum—and *chronos*—referring to clock time, the measurable time of succession. Rose (2004) formulated music as a “representation of the emotional quality of subjective, lived time made audible—an auditory apparition of felt-time” (p. 156), a statement illustrated via the near-universal appeal of Beethoven's so-called *Moonlight Sonata* (No. 14, Op. 27,

No. 2, C# minor), a programmatic title applied by a poet some 30 years after its composition. Rose argued that

the structure [of the music] is devoid of any referential meaning to things outside itself. It has nothing to do with either moonlight or other scenes from nature, let alone abstract concepts such as courage or longing. Rather, the accumulation of three-note wave after similar wave combines near-constancy with minute differences, and this gradual intensification of focused attentions is associated with mounting feeling. (p. 97)

In its unique capacity to transform—or in any case, alter—our perceptual and sensory experience of time, music can serve a host of complex, multidetermined, or overdetermined intrapsychic functions: it can provoke a heightened anticipation of a future moment, induce or relax states of tension, seem to suspend time's ineluctable forward movement, or affectively evoke temporally distant events or reminiscences from the past.

Music listening, a psychological-auditory event, occurs in the present and, like our perceptions of time itself, moves the present toward the future; it can also induce the sense that time is standing still or trigger associative links to earlier times (Stein 2004a). These paradoxical experiences are understood by a consideration of rhythm, particularly the gentle swaying or rocking motions used in calming a distressed infant. Fetal and infant life are dominated by the rhythms of the body—mother's and child's alike—and these interoceptive, kinesthetic, and biorhythmic experiences are no doubt vestigially retained and resurrected in later life, perhaps most especially in moments of duress when the mind might regressively dissociate to a primitive developmental state when an abstract sense of time has yet to be consolidated. Cradle-like rocking and other lulling mechanisms associated with early life, as well as such later derivatives as slow, rhythmic counting used to quell anger or fear, are thus often used for self-soothing during traumatic or painful events. Similarly, apprehension of time, both conceptual and sensory, is frequently distorted when there is a traumatic breach of the stimulus barrier. There will often be a discontinuity between the sense of time experienced and time remembered as well as significant alterations to perceptions of duration; spans of time can seem compressed or expanded, accelerated, decelerated, or stopped entirely (Stein 2004a).

Music's discursive narrativism engenders a sense of time's passage, of a traveling away from now toward some moment hence. Even a retrograde figure (as in a fugue where a thematic subject is reintroduced in reverse), a sonically deceptive Escher-like contrivance used to convince our ears that the end precedes the begin-

ning, nonetheless engages our perception of an unraveling toward a conclusion, not a regressive implosion backward. Concisely put, in transforming our perceptual and sensory experience of time, music can serve complexly defensive or coping functions: it can provoke a heightened anticipation of a future moment, induce or relax states of tension, seem to suspend time's ineluctable forward movement, or affectively evoke temporally distant events or reminiscences from the past.

Especially in states of mourning or in the wake of a traumatic disturbance, music can function analogously

with the latent wish underlying the dream work, serving as a creative solution to a traumatic reality. This is in keeping with what Loewald (1988) supposed are certain "magical" qualities of art, "connected with the achievement of a reconciliation—with the return, on a higher level of organization, to the early magic of thought, gesture, word, image, emotion, fantasy, as they become united again with what in ordinary nonmagical experience they only reflect, recollect, represent, or symbolize" (pp. 80–81). The mind's ear is a fertile locus of interior listening where mental functioning can be translated into conjured sound having symbolic significance.

KEY POINTS

- Music and psychoanalysis are connected by three common concerns: the study of meaning, the nature and expression of affects, and forms of communication. Both privilege the auditory channel. The fundamental nexus of music and psychoanalysis is the interpretation of meaning from sound.
- Psychoanalytically oriented writings about music can be roughly organized into three categories: 1) those that deal with the biography of the composer and attempts to understand the composition through his or her life events; 2) those that present psychoanalytic treatment studies or psychobiographies of musicians and composers; and 3) those that attempt a metapsychological approach to understanding the psychological meaning of music. The study of music employing these categories is considered a form of "applied psychoanalysis." A more contemporary approach engages music as interdisciplinary, requiring scholars to be knowledgeable about music and psychoanalysis.
- Various formulations were advanced to explain the interrelation of music and emotional experience. Three primary conceptualizations were distilled: 1) narrative route (music is itself the site of a pre-encoded narrative to be transmitted to a listener); 2) direct route (music is isomorphically concordant with the listener's emotions—music sounds the way emotion feels); and 3) indirect route (the listener's emotional reactions are the result of defensive ego-reorganizational activity triggered by auditory stimuli).
- Contemporary psychoanalytic studies of music emphasize the dynamic interplay between internal psychological, psychoacoustic, psychosomatic, affective, proprioceptive elements and external musical, cultural, environmental, sociohistorical, political-aesthetic ones. The interaction between music and a listener (or composer) is conceptualized as an object relation in which an encounter with music triggers complex intrapsychic events or responses.
- Psychoanalysis offers unique tools and conceptual perspectives for understanding the psychological formation and development of individuals who become musicians.
- The physical organs of audition together with the sound environment of earliest life play profound formative roles in psychological development. The vestigial remnants of

early auditory perceptions, experiences, and impressions assert ongoing influences throughout the life cycle.

- Time is one of the most significant constitutive elements of music and human experience. Music listening is a psychological-auditory event; music can alter our perceptual, sensory, and psychological experience of time. Music can serve a host of complex intrapsychic functions.

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